Abstract: Networks are by now popular inter-organizational coordination modes.
The evolution of the governance of regulatory networks: The case of the European telecommunications regulatory network

Introduction
Networks are by now popular inter-organizational coordination modes in many different domains, complementing and substituting hierarchical and market modes (Powell 1990 ). In the public sector, networks are present in such fields as public service delivery (Provan, Milward 1995) , local economic development (Agranoff, McGuire 2003) , and international regulatory coordination (Levi-Faur 2010) -the latter subset constituting this paper's empirical subjects. However, we know very little regarding how networks are governed and how their governance evolves through time (Provan, Kenis 2008 ). Yet, studies point to the fact that the governance of networks is a strong determinant of their performance (Dyer et al. 2007 ).
This paper addresses the research question how does the governance form of networks evolve in time by empirically studying the European telecommunications regulatory network. One specific domain where networks are increasingly spreading as a coordination mode is international regulatory harmonization. At the international level, as globalization increases international business interconnectedness, so does the need for global regulation (Levi-Faur 2010 , Mattli, Woods 2009 ). However, given the fragmentation caused by the persistence of national sovereignty, networks become the sole inter-organizational transnational coordination mode available to national regulatory agencies (Kahler, Lake 2009 ). Research regarding regulatory networks is incipient (Coen, Thatcher 2008) . While a few studies are starting to look at regulatory networks (Levi-Faur 2010), more research is called for (Levi-Faur 2010) , in particular regarding their governance and their evolution.
The paper goes as follows. We first present the concept of network as an organizing form-an interorganizational coordination mode-and present a typology of different goal-directed network types. We then review the literature on the governance of goal-Independent Dependent Interdependent (Powell 1990) Social Networks, Goal-Directed Networks, and Regulatory
Networks
As opposed to social networks-an analytical concept describing a social structure made up of individuals (or organizations) connected by some sort of interdependencies-goal-directed networks are defined as "groups of three or more legally autonomous organizations that work together to achieve not only their own goals but also a collective goal" (Provan, Kenis 2008) . The object of this paper are goal-directed inter-organizational networks setup by national regulatory agencies (NRAs).
As regulation-by-network increases in practice, it is starting to draw attention from scholars. In many regulated fields where regulatory responsibilities have not been effectively delegated to a supranational entity, goal-directed networks are the only viable international coordination mode among autonomous national regulatory agencies [NRAs] .
Regulatory networks, as a subset of public networks, have certain peculiarities. As Herranz (2008) points out "unlike for-profit networks, public networks are often characterized by additional legal, procedural, and political accountability relationships that constrain a public network's capacity to flexibly form, expand, contract, or disband (3)." Two are the most relevant specificities of regulatory networks, when compared to other inter-organizational goal-directed networks. First, regulatory networks may be mandated by legislation, as is the case for several
European networks composed by NRAs and legally recognized by the European
Commission as consultative bodies. Mandated networks are not as capable as other networks to modify their characteristics: i.e. purpose, rules, membership. Such modifications may require legislative action. Thus, mandated networks are not fully autonomous to modify themselves. For important changes to happen to mandated networks, these may have to be approved externally by a legislative body or any other non-member. For example, modifications to certain European regulatory networks need to be decided by the Council of the EU and the European Parliament.
Another major specificity of these networks is membership. Membership in regulatory networks, in particular if these are mandated networks, is often fixed. That is, members may not have the power to invite new members, who have not been specified in the network's founding mandate, to join the network: not everybody is eligible to partake in the network. Moreover, membership may be obligatory for some. And in addition, participation in many regulatory networks is by right, it is not as a result of credible commitments (Kelemen, Tarrant 2011) . In our analysis of the case study, we bear in mind these singularities of regulatory networks.
Types of Goal-Directed Networks
In addition, regulatory goal-directed networks may differ according to their purpose.
In essence, public networks may deal incrementally with information exchange, member capacity-building, collective strategy-development, and joint execution (Agranoff 2007 ). This conceptual framework of different types of goal-directed networks will help us in exploring the evolution of the network studied.
The Governance of Networks
Irrespective of their purpose, goal-directed networks must somehow be governed to ensure coordinated action to achieve their goals (Saz-Carranza, Ospina 2011). Provan and Kenis (2008) define the governance of networks as "the use of institutions and resources to coordinate and control joint action across the network as a whole" (231).
There is a lack of studies understanding how networks are governed. Indeed, network scholars (Provan, Kenis 2008 , Milward, Provan 2006 argue that attention to governance is essential to any understanding of the dynamics of inter-organizational collaboration and the determinants of goal-directed network performance. Studies conclude that the governance of networks is a strong determinant of network performance (Dyer et al. 2007) .
It is well known that governing networks-or any other kind of interorganizational set-work is an inherently difficult task and by no means easy (Human, Provan 2000) .
Business scholars estimate that more than 50% of alliances fail (Kelly, Schaan & Jonacas 2002 , Park, Ungson 2001 . Failure rates are not available regarding public networks, but Huxham and Vangen (2000) have identified how collaboration often succumbs to what they term collaborative inertia. Thus, more work is necessary in the field of the governance of networks in general (Provan, Kenis 2008 , Saz-Carranza, Ospina 2011 . Provan and Kenis (2008) , provide a typology of governance forms of goal-directed networks. They propose three structural forms for goal-directed network governance:
shared governance among network members; the network governed by one of its members; and delegation of its governance to a network administrative organization (NAO). The NAO is "a separate entity…set up specifically to govern the network and its activities" (Provan, Kenis 2008) . These three forms allude to the structural dimension of network governance: i.e. the formal institutions and resources designed to coordinate and control joint action. Three Different Governance Forms (Provan, Kenis 2008) These forms conform a continuum along centralization and formalization. Shared governance among members is the least formalized and most decentralized (Provan, Kenis 2008) . When the network is governed by one of its members or a non-member specialized NAO, the network's governance form is more centralized and formalized.
We refer to centralization when significant decision-making occurs only in one organizational unit. This does not mean that this unit-i.e. the NAO-makes decisions unilaterally, but that this unit is the place where decisions are made and legitimized-whether by consensus, voting, or otherwise (Provan, Kenis 2008) .
Formalization indicates the extent to which the rights and duties of the members of the organization are written down in rules, procedures, and instructions (Provan, Kenis 2008 , Ring, Van de Ven 1994 . Provan and Kenis' (2008) ground-breaking work on network governance does not explicitly provide a specific set of defining elements of the governance form. From their description of the three governance forms we here derive the following elements:
• centralization of coordination activities
• the nature of member interaction
• the power balance among members
• the formalization of the governance form
• and distribution of cost of governance
The following table summarizes the characteristics for each governance form. 
Network process
In this second part of the literature review, we lay out the conceptual framework we use--in combination with the network literature above presented-to explore the development process of the governance of the European telecoms regulatory network.
Following (Van de Ven, Poole 1995), we define development as "a change process,
i.e. a progression of change events that unfold during the duration of an entity's existence-from the initiation or onset of the entity to its end or termination (512)" 1 .
Van de Ven and Poole (1995) , in a seminal article on organizational process theorizing, identify four types of process theories: linear-sequential lifecycle, teleological (repetitive circular), evolutionary (driven by environment), and dialectical.
They propose the framework for researchers to use and identify which of the four process theories is applicable to the case in point. However, scholars differ about the changes along a collaborative's life-cycle. E.g. some scholars predict trust will grow with the collaboration, while others that it is an initial precondition and that it decreases as the collaborative is socialized within the participating organizations (Commission 2003 , Larson 1992 , Lowndes, Skelcher 1998 , Kanter 1994 , Saz-Carranza, Vernis 2006 .
Specifically regarding network governance form evolution, very little has been said. Provan and Kenis (2008) tentatively suggest a life-cycle process in which the form "is likely to evolve in a predictable pattern from shared governance to a more brokered form and from participant governed to externally (NAO) governed (246)."
Teleological theories imply a repetitive, circular sequence of goal formulation, implementation, evaluation, and, if necessary, modification. Often, teleological theories incorporate the idea of equifinality-that difference equally effective paths may exist to achieve the same goal. These theories tend to assume highly rational actors-in that they define goals and evaluate actions accordingly-but do accept that goals are socially constructed and do also change. This social-constructionist and A cyclical approach to interorganizational collaboration consists of reiterative sequences of negotiation and commitment-where actors bargain and agree to rulesexecution, and evaluation (Ring, Van de Ven 1994 , Ariño, de la Torre 1998 , Doz 1996 . As new situations are encountered and problems arise, the actors enter again the negotiation stage and will modify only those aspects perceived as problematic while retaining the other previously reached commitments. Learning occurs throughout the cycle (Weiss, Visioni 2003) .
Dialectic theories pose that change (or the absence of it) occurs due to colliding forces that compete with each other for domination. Thus, these theories suggest that a thesis is challenged by an antithesis, which then result in a synthesis. These theories do allow for stability and non-change in those cases where the thesis overwhelmingly overpowers the anti-thesis, thus generating a synthesis which is identical to the thesis.
Dialectical approaches are certainly not new in organizations studies. During the late '70s, Benson (1975) and Zeitz (1980) used a dialectics approach to organizational theory and interorganizational relations, respectively. In the '80s, Astley and Van de Ven (1983) proposed to reconcile central debates in Organization Theory 2 via a dialectical perspective. A decade later, Nutt and Backoff (1992) proposed a dialectical approach to strategy. Yet, to our knowledge, a dialectical process approach to network governance has not been applied.
Evolutionary theories also parallel the biological principles of variation-selectionretention which is at the basis of ( The four theories imply very different characteristics. Thus, evolutionary and lifecycle theories are deterministic in that some sort of inherent imprinted routine paces the emergence-evolution-termination and variation-selection-retention sequences.
Teleological and dialectical are, on the contrary, open-ended and socially constructed.
Evolutionary and dialectical theories imply at least two actors in competition or in conflict, respectively. On the contrary, life-cycles and teleology are self-referential in nature-though they allow for more than one unit to be involved in the process.
Additionally, each theory implies very different mechanisms: life-cycle theories imply compliance to best fit the present stage, teleology involves purposive analysis, conflict is at work in dialectics, and variation and competition in evolutionary theories. Lastly, each of the theories involves different event sequences. The table below summarizes these characteristics. The above description allows the researcher to analyze the change studied and identify its main characteristics. He or she can then use one, or more, of the change theories that apply and further explore, describe, and explain the development.
For example, if when exploring a developmental process the researcher finds that two units are in conflict to take control over the same object then it should consider the dialectical approach. If he/she finds that an organization-or several organizations collaborating and thus behaving as one-modifies its action to better direct itself towards the achievement of a specific goal, then he/she should use a teleological approach in theorizing the development.
These different theorizing approaches are not exclusive of one another other. Van de Ven and Poole (1995) are very pungent in their call for combining more than one "primitive" process theory when constructing a specific theory of change.
They justify drawing on different process theories because of several reasons. First, by definition organizational process phenomena extend in time and space. Therefore, different process theories may come into play at different points in time or space.
Second, any of the above four process theories, are inherently incomplete: key components in all theories are exogenous to the phenomenon studied, i.e. how is emergence triggered in the life-cycle model? How is dissatisfaction triggered in a teleology model; antithesis in dialectics; or variation in the evolutionary model?
When the researcher identifies more than one theory applicable, then he/she will have to determine how are the different change theories related. The relationship between theories may be nested or at the same level of analysis. Theories may operate simultaneously or sequentially.
Methods
Our research design consists of a qualitative case study using content-analysis of documents and transcripts of in-depth interviews. Three reasons justify in-depth qualitative research as the most appropriate methodology to address the inquiry: the dynamic nature of the topic, the absence of previous empirical research, and the exploratory character of the research question (Agranoff and Radin 1991; Marshall and Rossman 1995; Saz-Carranza and Ospina 2010 Among EU regulatory networks, those in the telecoms, energy, and financial sectors are experiencing important transformations and political deliberations and have recently finalized a third wave of integration. BEREC was finally selected because we were able to secure access to this network.
Data collection was based on in-depth individual and group interviews with staff of both the network and NRAs. The interviews elicited the interviewee to describe its personal experience with the network, to narrate how the network was designed and why, to identify which were the most difficult and conflictive moments during network evolution and how they were resolved. A fluid interpretive technique allowed flexibility to move the conversation in any direction to capture these broadly and deeply.
We also analyzed documents, in particular documents proposing and determining network governance forms and rules of procedures. We also analyzed correspondence between the key actors involved in the network design.
Our data is based on documentation and interviews with 15 distinct interviewees from 6 different National Regulatory Agencies (NRAs), the European Commission (EC) and the BEREC Office. The interviews could not be recorded since interviewees would not allow to it, but detailed notes were taken from the conversations.
Interview sampling was based on a snowball strategy (Miles, Huberman 1994) . We started with one NRA with whom we had access and then we moved on through the network. The four most influential NRAs identified by the interviewees are included, as well as the EC and the incipient BEREC office. For NRAs, the equivalent to the director for international affairs were interviewed-who are those most involved in the negotiation and those who prepare the meetings of the different NRA chairmen.
Both the detailed notes from the interviews as the main documents were coded.
AtlasTi was used to help organizing documents and quotes during the coding process.
We coded the interview notes using an inductive coding strategy (Miles, Huberman 
Findings
The teleological dialectics of network evolution
Based on our analysis of the main documents and interviews, we propose that the dialectic mode is the most appropriate process model to understanding BEREC's evolution. This we believe for the following reasons:
Conflict and tension between NRAs and the EC first, and among NRAs later, were evident in the interviews. All interviewees recognized the tension between the EC and the NRAs, and many also recognized tensions among NRAs in defining the smallprint of BEREC's rules of procedures. 
ID Quotes
P4
BEREC is a compromise. EC wanted an euro-regulator. NRAs opposed centralization because proximity to diverse national markets is essential (for example, Germany's prices are 10 times those of Austria). Countries vary a lot in markets, in how NRAs function…
P5
BEREC regulation was part of a package with several dimensions to it. The Council…opposed the European agency. The Parliament, on the other hand, proposed strengthening ERG. Hence, BEREC was the result.
P7
NRAs were against EECMA since it did not respect balance of power between EC, member states, and EP. And it didn't respect the Meroni doctrine 3 .
P10 Tension between EC and NRAs is that between uniform regulation versus jealous autonomy
P10
Major change between proposal and final solution: BEREC Office' smaller in size (150 to 28). Danger was that BEREC Office could turn into an instrument of the EC. Now, there is a balance between BEREC Office and NRAs.
P12
BEREC is a compromise between NRAs and EC. EC was disappointed with slow harmonization and proposed a Euro-regulator (i.e. EECMA). NRAs reacted defensively to preserve "status quo". They first conveyed a unitary message and then contacted their ministries.
P13
The compromise is rather a compromise [of the EC] with the Council (and to a lesser extent probably with EP), than a compromise with the NRAs.
© Saz-Carranza & Longo 
The grand dialectic of BEREC's creation
The dialectical process can be reduced in analytical terms as a tension between the hierarchy as a coordination mechanism advocated by the EC at one end, and the most informal and decentralized network form advocated by NRAs (and the Council) at the other end. Using Provan and Kenis' (2008) framework, the table below summarizes the different proposals and forms advocated for and (in some cases) implemented. The following • "You are aware about the serious concerns of many market participants, which are shared by the European Commission, about the present lack of consistency as regards the application of the regulatory framework."
• "I envisage, as indicated to you at our meeting, to include in the future regulatory framework a clause allowing the Commission to: (1) request that a national regulatory authority replaces an inappropriate measure by a regulatory action that will remedy the competition problem effectively; (2) request a national regulatory authority to undertake an analysis of a market and/or to adopt a remedy within a reasonable time-frame."
• "The institutional set-up of the ERG does not allow it to achieve, even with the best intentions, a consistent application of remedies or a common regulatory approach to cross-border issues."
18/01/2007: ERG to EC
• "In Bratislava, NRAs agreed to establish a permanent…Chairman's Secretariat, composed by two to four junior and middle officials seconded by NRAs."
30/01/2007: EC to ERG
• "Even though this improvement in the work of the ERG is welcome…, we believe that the present status of the ERG as mere advisory body to the Commission-working mainly on the basis of consensus, without powers of enforcing its decisions and without guaranteed transparency and accountability, in particular towards the European Parliament-could become a constraint on its evolution in the longer term."
27/02/2007: ERG to EC
• "ERG maintains its opposition to the Commission's…proposal of a…"veto on remedies" plus the power to impose remedies on NRAs…on the grounds of subsidiarity."
The first response by IRG/ERG is to upgrade their structure, setting up a secretariat in Brussels. Thus they move decidedly from a rotating participant-lead governance to a NAO governance form. Since IRG's inception in late 90's, the governance of the network had been shared by its membership. One NRA chaired the IRG and its "virtual" secretariat, composed of a few (up to 4) officers, was distributed: each officer working at its home NRA. By early 2009, IRG/ERG had a four-man team set up in Brussels: a Head, two Juniors Officers and an Administrative Aid.
In addition, this enhanced IRG/ERG exchanged several letters with the EC to argue for and justify its progress and impact so far. 
P1
NRAs lobbied to remain independent. In the council we contacted the permanent representation. We also contacted the parliament.
P4
All NRAs decided to go back and collect as much arguments as possible against EC proposal. The resistance was channeled through to the EU's political dimension. The process took a long time.
P5
Council did not see with good eyes a greater role for the Commission and did not understand that the agency would have been independent from the Commission. NRAs and powerful national champions influenced the Council.
P10
ERG reacted badly to proposal--It was not a good proposal--. First, ERG reacted with a joint communications effort and then NRAs lobbied their MEP
P12
NRAs reacted defensively to preserve "status quo". They first conveyed a unitary message and then contacted their ministries.
Intra-network dynamics
As NRAs joined forces to block the EC's proposal and to create a governance form that safeguarded the distinct NRA's turf, they also maneuvered trying to influence the internal decision-making of BEREC. The network form had prevailed over the hierarchy (or authority) thanks to the framing and mobilizing activities of the NRAs. regulations across Europe as well as the need to share information and knowledge among NRAs. These uniting factors did not however eliminate the fact that NRAs are extremely different among them. As interviewees recognized, differences occur along language, culture, size, independence, and national market structure.
When defining the procedures for voting, the NRAs therefore strongly negotiated among themselves. In essence, a group of NRAs challenged the status quo of ERG and rejected the direct transposition onto BEREC of ERG's rules regarding voting.
At ERG, decisions were taken on the basis of simple majority of "yes" votes over "no" votes. Abstentions, both explicit and implicit (i.e. when a member present did not emit a vote, either yea, no, o abstention), were not taken into account. BEREC's BoR, on the other hand, according to its rules of procedure requires 2/3 majority of "yes" votes of total number of members. This change in voting was championed by a group of NRAs dissatisfied with the status quo. According to interviews, dissatisfied
NRAs believed that ERG treatment of abstentions and its majority threshold benefitted the then-stronger NRAs since abstentions were numerous-either because of lack of capacity or group pressure (most voting was done openly). One of the dissatisfied NRAs proposed that decisions be taken by consensus.
Facilitated by another dissatisfied NRA, the final proposal adopted requires 2/3 explicit and real majority. 4 Electronic voting at BEREC is slightly different. It is divided into two phases. First a proposal is shared by the Chairman to which comments are made. A second proposal is produced incorporating the comments as far as possible. The second proposal is then voted using the same procedure as in physical voting. ERG did not have a specific procedure for such voting. This two-phase system was sponsored by some NRAs that were critical of the previous system, where the Chairman integrated the comments as far as possible and then directly accepted the proposal without going through any voting or further discussion. The figure below illustrates the dialectical process that occurred in defining the specific rules of procedures of BEREC. In essence, the status quo voting proceduresimple majority, where abstentions did not count-was challenged by an antithesis:
consensus. The resulting synthesis was that all decisions required a 2/3 real and explicit majority of all members. 
Discussion
We here discuss our findings in relation to the literature. We discuss the process theories applicable to this case, their relationship and nesting, the congruence of our findings with predictions of network governance design, and relate our findings to European regulatory politics literature.
As we explained in the findings, the overall dynamics of BEREC's evolution is best represented by a dialectical process. This process is visible in the tension between the two opposing forces represented by the EC and the NRAs (these latter joining forces with the Council and, to a lesser degree, the EP). This recalls the out-group/in-group conflict proposed by the sociological literature. It is well known that being under attack or in front of a common enemy may unite parties: Out-group conflict is associated with in-group cohesion (Astley, Van de Ven 1983; Coser 1956 ). This phenomenon is clearly visible in IRG/ERG, and later in BEREC, where NRAs unite to counter the EC. This may be particularly interesting in mandated networks, where parties constituting the network may not be the ones in charge of designing and defining the network characteristics. Thus, a dialectical tension may be expected between network members and the party in charge of designing or deciding on the network characteristics.
Interestingly, in mandated networks, such as regulatory networks, strong mobilization and framing activities may be expected to occur prior to full formation or crystallization of the network. This contrasts with the network management literature where framing and mobilizing of the network occur continually (Agranoff, McGuire 2001 , Saz-Carranza, Ospina 2011 . This is understandable since mandated networks may require an external non-member to modify the network's structure (Herranz 2008 ).
We also find a second dialectical tension, this time fully comprised within the network itself, endogenous in nature. As soon as ERG is turned into BEREC, with more responsibilities, decision-making becomes important. IRG/ERG internal decision-making was not a contested issue among NRAs, since it was essentially an information-sharing network. However, when it turns into BEREC, NRAs do get heavily involved in framing internal procedures. As BEREC turns into a quasi- or later?) Thus, in a mandated network such as the one studied, the origin of the dialectical dynamics of change may lie in an external actor (the one mandating the network or in charge of designing the mandated network). The external actor may decide that the governance form of the mandated network is unsatisfactory and propose a change. It is reasonable to expect a reaction by network members to the proposal.
As mentioned, the evolution of the European telecoms regulatory network is in agreement of Provan and Kenis (2008) life-cycle linear incremental predictions. They argue that networks will tend to formalize and delegate coordinating activities as time evolves. In fact, our findings do coincide with their temporal predictions as with their design propositions. If IRG and BEREC are compared, their determining factors for network governance form apply. Thus, IRG seems to have high and distributed trust among members, moderate to high number of members (27), high goal consensus (to share information among NRAs), and a low need for network-level competences.
Such characteristics would call for a participant-shared governance form. In comparison, BEREC seems to have moderate trust (and intra-network activity monitored by the NAO), moderate to high number of members (27), moderate goal consensus (all NRAs agree that they have to advise the EC when requested but the content of BEREC's recommendations may be highly contested), and a need for high network-level competences (due to its increased responsibilities). BEREC 's governance form is then also congruent with Provan and Kenis (2008) . proposal, and recognize that they got involved in political activity to achieve their goal. In fact, as early as in the 1999, the EC officially stated in its public consultation report that NRAs (not the Council) had objected to the creation of a formal NRA network (the HLCG). However, all NRA representatives recognized that they worked via the Council, who was neither very supportive of the EC's proposal.
Conclusion
In this paper, we set out to explore the process by which public networks evolve in time. Specifically, we focused on how the governance form evolved in a European regulatory network. Based on organization theory and public management literatures, we identify a dialectical dynamic triggered by teleological evaluation cycles.
We find that the network's governance system is determined by the dialectical tension between network members (National Regulatory Agencies) and an external very influential body (the European Commission, EC). We also identify a second dialectical tension endogenous to the network: that between the status quo and an alternative group of members. The first tension unifies the group in the classic external conflict-internal cohesion. The latter tension exists among the members. The tensions are triggered by evaluations carried out by an external actor (the EC) with enough capacity to influence the network's governance form.
In general, the process observed confirms the propositions that predict a formalizing of the governance as the network grows older. However, the evolution is neither lineal nor continuous. We also point out how the form evolves as more responsibilities are assigned to the network. And we also see the effect of the "shadow of hierarchy" on the levels of cooperation within the network.
As all studies, this one has various short-comings. The main one is that we used a single-case study as our empirical material. We justify this due to the exploratory nature of the study, as well as with the depth and richness of the data sought. Future studies will have to confirm our findings.
